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Andrew Gelman,  University of California at Berkeley, Department of Statistics 
Gary King, Harvard University, Department of Government 
In this paper we prove theoretically and demonstrate empirically that all existing measures of 
incumbency advantage in the congressional elections literature are biased or inconsistent.  We then 
provide an unbiased estimator based on a very simple linear regression model. We  apply this new 
method to congressional elections since 1900, providing the first evidence of a positive incumbency 
advantage in the first half of the century. 
Introduction 
Incumbency advantage is the most frequently studied factor in the last  15 
years of congressional elections research.  Discovery  of the increase in incum- 
bency advantage has sparked controversy over its origins, historical pattern, cur- 
rent magnitude, and electoral, democratic, and policy consequences.'  Even the 
most basic descriptive information about incumbency advantage is flawed be- 
cause every previous measure based on aggregate data in this literature is plagued 
by  selection bias,  inconsistencies, and inefficiencies.  We prove this result and 
also propose a new unbiased and statistically efficient measure that is very easy 
to calculate. Congressional elections from 1900 to the present fit our theoretical 
model. Our empirical reanalyses do not challenge the existing scholarly consen- 
sus that incumbency advantage is much larger than it once was. However, we do 
challenge the prevailing belief that incumbency advantage was nonexistent, and 
the evidence that it was negative, in House elections during the first half of this 
century (Alford and Brady  1988). We  show instead that the average advantage 
of incumbency in these elections was about two percentage points. 
In section  1 of this paper, we define incumbency advantage, and section 2 
gives an intuitive sense of the problems identifying it even in ideal electoral sys- 
tems. Section 3 formally proves that sophomore surge and retirement slump are 
biased estimates of incumbency advantage, and section 4 briefly reveals the flaws 
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in other existing measures. We offer an improved  measure in section 5 that is 
based  on a  simple  regression  model  with  three  explanatory  variables  and  is 
therefore  very  easy  to implement  (see equation  6, below).  This familiar  re- 
gression  framework also enables one to  see potential problems  more clearly. 
Empirical analyses in section 6 demonstrate the biases in sophomore surge and 
retirement slump and the advantages of  our measure. Finally, in section 7, we 
analyze the problem of uncontested seats in estimates of incumbency advantage. 
1. Definition of Incumbency Advantage 
We define the theoretical incumbency advantage for a single legislative dis- 
trict election as 
where 
w(') = proportion of the vote received by the incumbent legislator in his or 
her district,  if he or she runs against major party opposition (thus, w(0 is 
unobserved in an open seat election), and 
w(O) = proportion of the vote received by the incumbent party  in that dis- 
trict, if the incumbent legislator does not run and all major parties compete 
for this open seat; (wcO)  is unobserved if the incumbent runs for reelection). 
We define the aggregate incumbency advantage for an entire legislature as the 
average of the incumbency advantages for all districts in a general election. This 
theoretical definition applies within a single election year and allows incumbency 
advantage to differ across districts.  Our results hold  in this  general case, but 
below  we  often assume for simplicity  that  it  varies over time but  not across 
districts, and that the incumbency advantage accruing to Democratic and Repub- 
lican legislators is the same. 
Note that the definition in equation 1 does not assume that the candidates in 
w(')and wcO)  are identical in all respects except for incumbency status. Our theo- 
retical definition of incumbency advantage properly includes the electoral advan- 
tages of  all the perquisites of office: constituency service,  fund-raising,  name 
recognition,  visibility,  and others. We also do not make the counterfactual as- 
sumption that candidate quality is the same for incumbents and challengers, al- 
lowing quality also to be included in our definition. 
2. Bias in Intuitive Measures 
The incumbency advantage in a district depends on both w(') and wcO);  un- 
fortunately, a real election in a single district will reveal only one of these (or 
none,  if  the election is uncontested). This problem of measuring incumbency Andrew Gelrnan and Gary King 
Table 1. Election Outcomes in a Hypothetical Congressional District 
with No Incumbency Advantage 
Democratic 
Vote in  Incumbent Party  Democratic Vote  Change in Vote for the 
Election  1  in Election 2  in Election 2  Incumbent from 1 to 2 
advantage can therefore be thought of  as causal estimation with  missing data 
(Rubin 1974). An  inappropriate analysis of  these data can too easily lead to 
selection bias (Achen 1986). 
In this brief section, we explore our definition of incumbency advantage by 
applying it to a theoretical electoral system in which incumbency has no effect 
on votes; that is, $ = 0 for all district elections. This analysis provides intuition 
about the central problem in analyzing these data. 
Consider a congressional district that, on average, supports the two political 
parties equally and gives no advantage to incumbency. Assume the Democratic 
proportion of the two-party vote in two consecutive elections in this district,  v, 
and  v,, differ from 0.5 only due to independent random factors. Also assume 
that the winner in an open seat election at time  1 runs again as an incumbent 
in  election 2. Then, four typical and equally likely outcomes are displayed in 
Table 1. 
In two of the four cases in this table, the incumbent party in election 2 loses 
votes; in the other two cases, nothing changes. Looking just at changes between 
elections, it appears that incumbency either has no effect (the first and last case) 
or reduces the vote (the middle two cases). One might be tempted to conclude 
that incumbency actually hurts a candidacy. In fact, we set up these hypothetical 
district elections so that incumbency has no effect at all. The vote decline from 
time  1 to time 2 is merely a statistical selection effect, owing to the fact that 
incumbent candidates in the second election always received at least half of the 
vote in the first. This selection problem is reflected in most existing measures, a 
subject to which we now turn. 
3. Sophomore Surge and Retirement Slump 
In  this section we formally analyze the two most popular measures of  in- 
cumbency advantage: sophomore surge and retirement slump. Sophomore surge ESTIMATING INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE WITHOUT BIAS  1145 
is the average vote gain for freshman winners in election  1 who run again in 
election 2. Retirement slump is the average vote loss for the parties whose can- 
didates won election 1 and did not run in election 2. Note that sophomore surge 
and retirement slump are each based on only a small fraction of legislative races 
(see, e.g., Cover and Mayhew  1977). In two separate subsections, we demon- 
strate the direction and then the size of the bias in these measures. 
We begin with several definitions: 
v?  is the Democratic proportion of the two-party vote in a contested district 
election at time t (t = 1, 2) with an incumbent running. If the district is an 
open seat election, v',"  is unobserved. 
v',O1 is the Democratic proportion of the vote in an open seat contested dis- 
trict election at time t (t = 1, 2). If the incumbent runs,  vjo)is  unobserved. 
I, equals 1 if a Democratic incumbent runs for reelection, 0  if no incumbent 
runs, and -  1 if a Republican incumbent is seeking reelection. 
$,  is the incumbency advantage in election t, the proportion of the vote an 
incumbent running in a district would receive solely because he or she had 
been elected before and served as the incumbent representative. 
6 is the nationwide partisan swing, the average change in the Democratic 
proportion of district votes between elections 1 and 2. 
uiO)  is defined for convenience as viO) - 6, the digrict Democratic vote 
proportion in an open seat after correcting for nationwide partisan swing. 
f(viO))  is the theoretical probability distribution that generates v',O) in elec- 
tion t. 
All these variables and parameters refer to a single electoral district and exist in 
theory, although are not all observed in every election in practice. This section 
thus retains our theoretical focus; we consider data and empirical estimators only 
after sorting out the theoretical issues. 
Proof of  Bias in Sophomore Surge and Retirement Slump 
We  assume that the incumbency effect $ is equal for each pair of elections 
1 and 2, so vj" = vjO) + $1,. We  also assume that the marginal density f is 
symmetric between elections 1 and 2, except for the nationwide vote swing 6. 
Write the joint  density function of  partisan preferences f(vjo), viO)).  Then the 
symmetry condition states: 
This assumption allows the vote in any district to differ from election 1 to elec- 
tion 2, but constrains the shape of  the probability density to remain constant. I 146  Andrew Gelman and Gary King 
The mean of this density is shifted by the nationwide partisan swing 6 and is 
thus allowed to vary between election years., 
For a district with a Democratic sophomore incumbent at time 2, the sopho- 
more surge is defined as the proportion of the vote this candidate receives run- 
ning for reelection at time 2 minus the proportion he or she received in his or her 
first election at time 1: 
The condition (I, = 0, I,  =  1) indicates that the district was an open seat in 
time 1 and that the Democrat won election 1 and ran as an incumbent in election 
2. (Our mathematical treatment ignores the rare occasions that a freshman vic- 
tory is obtained by beating an incumbent.) 
How good a summary of incumbency advantage is the sophomore surge? 
We analyze this question by calculating the expected value of SSD. If sophomore 
surge were an unbiased estimate of the incumbent advantage, then its expected 
value would be 4. However, 
This result  is  proved  rigorously  in  the  appendix.  Essentially,  the  inequality 
comes from the expression SSD = v:"  -  vl0'  in equation 2.  The positive term 
v$" can take on any value from 0 to  1, while the negative term -  vlO' is con- 
strained to exceed 0.5. This works to diminish the sophomore surge to below the 
incumbency advantage. 
Similarly, we define the Republican sophomore surge as: 
and similar analysis shows: 
2This assumption is  thus  considerably more  realistic than  uniform partisan  swing  (Butler 
1951), is more  flexible than  that  made by  King (1990). and is essentially equivalent to that  made 
by King and Gelman (in press), except that  we do not restrict f to take any particular mathemati- 
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Inequalities (3) and (5) show that sophomore surge underestimates  the true in- 
cumbency effect,  even after correcting for nationwide swing. 
The expected retirement slump for the Democrats from election I to elec- 
tion 2 is: 
using virtually the same analysis as above. Similarly, 
E(RS,)  = E[-(vy' - viO')  I  1, = -  1, I, = 01  3  $ + 6 
This analysis indicates that retirement slump is higher on average than the in- 
cumbency effect, even after correcting for nationwide swing. 
Extent of  the Discrepancy 
In  the  last  subsection, we  proved  that  sophomore surge and  retirement 
slump differ systematically from incumbency advantage. In this subsection, we 
calculate the size of this theoretical discrepancy by adopting a simple parametric 
model. 
We  calculate  the  expected  values  of  sophomore  surges  and  retirement 
slumps, assuming that  district votes  (without  incumbency) follow  a bivariate 
normal distribution: 
In this case, the conditional expectation of a district vote change is just a linear 
regression: 
E(viO' - v',"  I  v',")  = 6 - (1 - p)(v(,O' - p) 
The expected sophomore surge for Democrats becomes 
Using  the  standard  result  on the expectation  of  a  truncated  normal  variable 
(Johnson and Kotz 1970, 81), 
where C#I  is the normal probability density function and @ is the normal cumula- 
tive distribution function. Andrew Gelman and Gary King 
Similarly, 
To find the practical meanings of these calculations, we must choose reason- 
able values for the parameters p (the expected vote at time 1 if  no incumbent is 
running, E(vlO)),  p (the correlation between vl0) and viO);  Democratic votes with 
no incumbent running at times  1 and 2), r2  (the variance of the district vote at 
time 1 and at time 2), and I) (the incumbency advantage). In fact, the data from 
contested U.S. congressional elections fit this bivariate normal model fairly well,  . 
so we chose empirically reasonable parameters. Table 2 displays the following 
theoretical discrepancies 
and 
for the six sets of parameter values specified by: p  = (0.5 and 0.6), p = 0.8, 
7 = 0.1, and J, = (O,O.O5, and 0.10). If these discrepancies were close to zero 
for all reasonable parameter values, then sophomore surge and retirement slump 
would be good measures. 
Unfortunately, the discrepancies reported in Table 2 illustrate that sopho- 
more surge is typically almost two percentage points lower than the true incum- 
bency effect, no matter how large the latter is. Retirement slump is almost two 
Table 2. Discrepancies of Sophomore Surge and Retirement Slump, 
Relative to the Incumbency Advantage 
Sophomore Surge  Retirement Slump 
u  = 0.5  u = 0.6  IL = 0.5  w = 0.6 ESTIMATING INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE WITHOUT BIAS  1149 
percentage points larger than the incumbency effect when I,!I  is small, but the bias 
diminishes with a larger incumbency effect. Biases of two percentage points on 
the scale of  Democratic votes represent statistical biases of  at least one-fifth of 
the true incumbency advantage; this bias can even change the sign of the esti- 
mated incumbency effect. 
4. Other Previous Measures of Incumbency Advantage 
Existing measures of incumbency advantage are relatively ad hoc but intui- 
tive constructs. None were created within any standard theory of inference, and 
until now, none have been evaluated to see whether they conform to any desirable 
statistical criteria. In this section we  briefly and more informally point out the 
biases and  inconsistencies in  five measures of  incumbency advantage that are 
used less frequently than sophomore surge and retirement slump. 
Erikson (1971) was the first to study the incumbency advantage systemati- 
cally and is perhaps most sensitive to the tricky problems involved in estimation. 
He considers regression to the mean  (selection bias), reciprocal causation, na- 
tionwide partisan swing, and other factors. He also produces estimates of  the 
incumbency advantage that, according to our empirical analyses, often produce 
relatively small biases. However, he uses a "regression on residuals" procedure 
that is quite biased in general (see King 1986, Appendix 1). 
Second, Alford and Brady (1988) propose using the average of  sophomore 
surge and retirement slump as a measure of  incumbency advantage. They call 
this average "slurge." Since sophomore surge is an underestimate and retirement 
slump is an overestimate, one might hope that an average of the two would yield 
a measure that is about right. Indeed, this average is a better estimate than either 
of the two quantities alone. However, Table 2 indicates that the biases in sopho- 
more surge and retirement slump cancel only when the true incumbency advan- 
tage is zero. Otherwise, sophomore surge is more of an underestimate than re- 
tirement slump is an overestimate; thus, "slurge"  will generally underestimate 
the true incumbency advantage. 
A third measure was proposed by  Garand and Gross (1984), who use the 
difference in  the vote margin  between  incumbent winners and  nonincumbent 
winners. This is an  intuitive measure of  how  incumbent districts differ from 
nonincumbent districts. However, as Jacobson (1987, 128) and Alford and Brady 
(1988, 6) note, selection bias is a serious problem, since incumbent losers are 
excluded entirely. This measure in general attributes party strength in a district 
to incumbency and therefore overestimates the incumbency advantage. 
Collie (1981) proposed a fourth measure by  tracking districts moving be- 
tween marginal and safe categories as different cohorts of open seat winners are 
reelected in subsequent elections. This is an excellent descriptive procedure and 
provides a good feel for individual patterns of  House reelection and defeat. Un- 
fortunately, it is also a flawed way of  measuring incumbency advantage because I 150  Andrew Gelman and Gary King 
of  regression to the mean  and because Collie only tracks districts with incum- 
bents who continue to win. 
Finally,  several variants of  sophomore surge and  retirement slump also 
exist. For example, many correct for nationwide partisan swing, a wise proce- 
dure when comparing changes over time. We  showed above that these measures 
are still biased. Another correction is to calculate scores separately for the Demo- 
crats and Republicans and then to average them. Payne (1980) does this, so his 
measure will not track with votes. This procedure causes no additional biases 
beyond the problems described in  section 3, but it is statistically inefficient if 
incumbency advantage is the same for both parties. Alford and Hibbing (1981) 
calculate sophomore surge and retirement slump for the second and third reelec- 
tions instead of only the first. This provides important information about elec- 
toral career paths, but it is biased for the same reasons as the standard sophomore 
surge and retirement slump measures are bia~ed.~ 
The problems with these and other measures suggest that scholars should 
take inference more seriously. The best approach to inference is not to invent 
some measure and immediately proceed to empirical analyses. Instead, we need 
to derive estimators with known statistical properties. This can be done either by 
formally evaluating intuitively created measures after the fact or through the 
formal procedures associated with a theory of statistical inference (King 1989). 
5. An Improved Estimator of Incumbency Advantage 
We  create our estimator in a familiar regression framework. This way, the 
problems we  must avoid in constructing an estimator with desirable statistical 
properties are very easily recognized, since they are listed in most textbooks (see 
Hanushek and Jackson 1977). We  first present this estimator and then discuss 
possible problems. 
To begin, denote v, and  v2 as the Democratic proportions of  the two-party 
vote in elections 1 and 2, respectively. As an illustration, Figure 1 shows these 
variables for contested districts in 1972 and 1974. As above, we let I, equal 1 if 
a Democratic incumbent runs for reelection, 0  if  no incumbent runs, and -  1 if 
a Republican incumbent is seeking reelection, in election t. In addition, P2 is 1 
if  the Democrat wins election 1, and -  1 if  the Republican wins. In this section 
and the next, we  follow the uniform practice in the literature of discarding un- 
contested seats; since this may cause selection bias, we discuss the problem and 
a solution in section 7. 
For a pair of election years, we base our measure of the incumbency effect 
30ther measures give an indication of the incumbent's advantage but are not intended to pro- 
vide a specific numerical estimate of  the vote proportion due to incumbency. For example, Cover 
and Mayhew (1977) calculate,  among other things, the percentage of  incumbents winning with at 
least 60% of  the vote. Jacobson (1987), Ansolabehere, Brady, and Fiorina (I988), and others have 
also calculated a variety of statistics measuring individual incumbents' vulnerability. ESTIMATING  INCUMBENCY  ADVANTAGE WITHOUT BIAS  1151 
Figure 1. Partisan Swing 
0  0.00  0.25  0.50  0.75  1 .OO 
Vote 1972 
$ on a linear regression of votes on incumbency status, controlling for previous 
votes and partisan swing: 
where the least squares estimate of $ is our measure of incumbency advantage. 
Including v,  considerably reduces the variance of the estimate of $ and elimi- 
nates a large source of  possible bias.  Including the party  of  the winner, P2, 
allows the regression line of  v2  on v,  and I, to be at different levels for Democrats 
and  Republicans, with the slope of  the line held  constant. If  P2  were not  in- 
cluded, $ would probably be underestimated. Our estimator is not the same as 
retirement slump or sophomore surge; we maximize statistical efficiency by bas- 
ing our measure on all contested seats rather than on only the approximately 10% 
contested by sophomores or left open by retirees  .4 
We could add a control variable I,  to this equation for incumbency status at 
time 1, but we find in practice that this has no appreciable effect on our estimate 
of I) and therefore omit it. (If including I,  had an effect on the estimates in an 
4Some comments we received on an  earlier version of this  paper  show confusion over the 
definition of retirement slump. See section 2 of this paper for a precise definition. I 152  Andrew Gelman and Gary King 
application of this estimator to a different legislature, it should be included.) In 
the remainder of this section, we consider several other possible problems with 
our measure. 
Exogeneity of the Decision to Run 
One possible objection to this estimator is that it assumes that decisions to 
run  for reelection, I,, are exogenous to votes in  the second election,  v,.  For 
example, if incumbents frequently decided not to run for reelection because they 
knew they would be  likely to lose, this estimator would be  inconsistent. The 
primary reason for an incumbent (who obviously won the previous election) to 
believe he or she will be  defeated is probably alleged corruption of some kind. 
Thus, the study by  Peters and Welch (1980) should provide sufficient reason to 
think that I, is essentially exogenous to v,.  In the six election years from 1968 
to 1978, Peters and Welch find only 80 cases of alleged corruption among incum- 
bents (0.03 of all races). Among these House members, a slightly smaller frac- 
tion did run for reelection (0.813) than among all incumbents (0.879), but in two 
of the six elections those who were accused actually ran more frequently. More- 
over, they break down their 80 cases into several categories because some seem 
quite benign (like abuse of the franking privilege). In the two categories where 
they found any significant electoral effect (morals and bribery charges), only 18 
incumbents were implicated. This small number is a trivial fraction (0.007) of 
all races in this period. Other periods with more widespread corruption might be 
more problematic, but the complications entailed in making a correction would 
be more trouble than it is likely to be worth. 
We  can learn more about this estimator by noting that I, may be written as 
the product of two factors: I, = R2  P2  . The variable P, is defined above, and R2 
refers to the decision of  the incumbent to  seek reelection, coded as  1 if  the 
incumbent runs and 0 otherwise. Using this relationship, we can reexpress equa- 
tion 6 as follows: 
The variable I, = R,P, can then be thought of  as an "interaction"  effect. How- 
ever, only one of the two possible main effects, P2 ,  is included separately in this 
equation. This nonhierarchical model is appropriate because we seek to estimate 
the incumbency effect averaged over incumbents of both par tie^.^ 
SThe estimate  of  $ from  running equation  6 or  7  is  equivalent to  running  the  following 
regression: 
where w,  is the proportion of the vote for the winning candidate in  election 1, w2  is the incumbent 
party's vote proportion in  election 2 (i.e.,  the vote proportion in election 2 for the winning party in 
election I), and P2  and R2 are defined as above. (The other parameters are of secondary interest, but 
yo,  y,  ,  and y2 are linear functions of Po,  PI.  and p2  .) ESTIMATING INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE WITHOUT BIAS  I 153 
Control Variables 
In House elections, we find that our key explanatory variable, I,, is inde- 
pendent of  the control variable v, ,  after conditioning on the other control vari- 
able P, .6 In other words, incumbents do not base their decision of  whether to 
seek reelection on their vote total in the previous election. This fortunately makes 
our results fairly insensitive to the assumption that the modeled relationship is 
linear. 
We  could improve this estimator by adding other control variables to equa- 
tion 6, but one must be very careful to add only variables that occur before the 
winner's decision to seek reelection (R,).  For example, including a measure of 
the quality of the opposition candidate would be tempting but inappropriate be- 
cause the quality of the opposition candidate is largely dependent on the incum- 
bent's decision about whether to run for reelection, I,. Since the ability to scare 
away challengers is an important power of  incumbency, we  want this to be in- 
cluded as part of our estimate of incumbency advantage.' 
Personal Incumbency Advantage 
We defined incumbency advantage as the vote proportion gained by a party 
due to running an incumbent candidate in a district election. This is the sum of 
two effects: (1) personal advantage gained by a candidate due to his or her incum- 
bency, and (2) advantage gained by a party because its incumbent candidate is 
of  higher quality than the typical open seat candidate. This higher candidate 
quality presumably manifests itself in greater vote-getting ability separate from 
the personal incumbency  ad~antage.~  We  estimate the relative size of  effects 
(1) and (2) on our incumbency measure as follows. Sophomore surge is a biased 
estimate of the personal incumbency advantage effect (1). If effect (2) were sub- 
6For each pair of  elections,  we calculated  the proportion of  incumbents who received  vote 
totals in the previous election of between 0.50 and 0.55, 0.55 and 0.60, 0.60 and 0.65, and so on. 
These proportions were all approximately equal, and a chi-square test could not reject the hypothesis 
of equality of proportions. 
'An  appropriate control variable to add might be quality of potential opposition candidates. 
This variable would be appropriate because it is prior to the incumbent's decision to run, Rz.  In one 
extreme, if a district contained no potential high-quality opposition candidates, our measure (which 
does not include this control variable) would overestimate the incumbency advantage; the reason is 
that the effect of  an incumbent's  decision  to run  for reelection on the potential  opposition  party 
candidates' decision would add little to the incumbent's vote total. In districts with many high-quality 
potential opposition candidates,  the incumbent's decision to run for reelection could have a larger 
effect on the vote total by scaring away some of these candidates. Of course, data on potential high- 
quality opposition candidates would be very difficult to  collect even if one were to conduct a detailed 
analysis of  each congressional district. Alternatively, one could include a measure of  incumbent 
candidate quality, whether or not the incumbent decides to run for reelection, or perhaps the quality 
of  the opposition party candidate in the last election.  To further increase statistical efficiency, one 
might even include district-level economic variables as controls. 
*We  thank Robert Erikson for pointing this out to us. aawwwawawaaawa  gggggggggggggg 
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stantial, then our measure would  be  correspondingly larger than the personal 
advantage (1). In this case, our regression estimate of  incumbency advantage 
would be significantly greater than sophomore surge, beyond the difference pre- 
dicted by  our analysis of  the theoretical bias in sophomore surge in section 2. 
Our empirical analysis in section 6 shows that this does not happen: the average 
difference between the two estimates is 2.4 percentage points, which is less than 
one percentage point more than the theoretical bias of  sophomore surge shown 
in  Table 2. Thus, we  conclude that there is little difference between personal 
incumbency advantage and our measure. This conclusion-that  open seat can- 
didates are not significantly weaker than incumbent candidates, after correcting 
for personal incumbency advantage-is  plausible because the weakest open seat 
candidates are eliminated in primary challenges. 
The assumptions of regression analysis can be violated in many ways. We 
have already considered endogeneity, omitted variable bias, selection bias, and 
nonlinearity. We  also discuss a different kind of  selection bias that might occur 
due to dropping uncontested districts in section 7. The remaining possible vio- 
lations, such as heteroscedasticity and  (spatial) autocorrelation, are much less 
likely in our model. We  therefore conclude that our estimator is consistent, un- 
biased, and statistically efficient. 
A Simple Check on New Measures 
Finally, we provide a relatively simple and intuitive tool with which schol- 
ars can judge new estimators, that captures the ideas behind many formal statis- 
tical criteria. Table 3 presents a set of 64 hypothetical district election results. 
We  created these theoretical data with a true incumbency effect of $ = 0.10 by 
taking all possible combinations of the following five variables: R, (with values 
0 and l), expected votes with no incumbent running E(VO))  (0.45 and 0.53,  R, 
(0 and l), V, = E(V(O)) + $P,R,  + el  (where el takes on the values 0.06 and 
-0.06),  and  V,  = E(VO))  + $P,R,  + e2  (where e, takes on values 0.06 and 
-  0.06). This example assumes that expected votes are constant over time within 
districts and that incumbency is the only candidate-specific effect. 
Table 3 is useful for evaluating any potential estimator in the hypothetical 
situation where only these five variables are relevant: the decision to run in each 
of two elections, expected votes, and random error in each election. In order to 
introduce other variables (or other values of these variables) in this hypothetical 
system, one must make sure to use all possible combinations of the values. 
Although  the true  incumbency effect in  these hypothetical data is 0.10, 
sophomore surge is 0.04, retirement slump is 0.12, and "slurge"  is 0.08. Our 
estimator is based on a regression of the Democratic proportion of the two-party 
vote at time 2 (v,) on the Democratic proportion of the two-party vote at time 1 
(v,), the party of  the winner (P,), and incumbency status (I,): E(v2) = Po + 
PI  v,  + P2  P2 + $I2. It correctly estimates 4 = 0.10. ESTIMATING INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE WITHOUT BIAS  I  157 
6. Empirical Analyses 
In order to examine our theoretical predictions of bias in  sophomore surge 
and retirement slump and to apply our improved measure of incumbency advan- 
tage, we have collected electoral data from every election to the House of Rep- 
resentatives held in this ~entury.~ 
As is standard practice in  the literature, we  excluded districts with third- 
party victories. When third parties endorsed a major-party candidate, as is al- 
lowed in New  York, for example, we  combine these votes and allocate them to 
the major-party candidate. Votes for other third  parties are omitted. For each 
biennial general election, we  estimate the incumbency advantage using district 
election results in that election and the previous election. We  do not estimate 
incumbency advantage for election years ending in  "2"  because these immedi- 
ately follow redistricting, and tracking votes across these periods is not feasible 
at the district level. 
Figure 2 plots our estimate of  incumbency advantage (the solid line), along 
with sophomore surge (the dashed line) and retirement slump (the dotted line). 
These empirical results precisely support our theoretical analysis. Sophomore 
surge was lower than our estimate by  an average of 2.4 percentage points for the 
entire period. For most of  the years, using sophomore surge as a measure of 
incumbency  advantage would  (incorrectly) indicate that  incumbents are elec- 
torally disadvantaged. Retirement slump was about a percentage point above our 
measure until about 1960, when incumbency advantage rose, decreasing the bias 
in retirement slump. Our measure is also less variable than the two alternatives. 
This reflects the fact that our measure is more reliable and statistically efficient 
because it is based on all the districts contested in two successive election years. 
The results in Figure 2 are consistent with the congressional elections litera- 
ture which shows that incumbency advantage is much larger now than it has been 
in the past. However, the figure also contradicts the most complete analysis of 
9Data collection was surprisingly difficult. We compared data from Congressional Quarterly, 
the ICPSR, and from a data set collected from these sources by Professor Gary Jacobson. Because 
of the various coding rules, and coding errors, there were numerous inconsistencies. We resolved as 
many as we could by extensive cross-checking. 
The ICPSR collection does not include a variable for incumbency, and it is stored in a particu- 
larly inconvenient form, but it does include the proper names of the candidates.  We  were able to 
code incumbency by comparing the names of the winning candidates in successive elections. Unfor- 
tunately, this collection includes literally hundreds of problems. Most of the problems involve the 
alphabetically  coded  names.  These appear in  numerous  inconsistent  formats:  (1) FIRST  LAST; 
(2) LAST,  FIRST; (3) F.  LAST;  (4) LAST,  F.; (5) LAST; and (5) FRITS LATS; among other 
combinations and misspellings. We wrote a simple pattern recognition program that helped find many 
of these errors.  We  then had research assistants look through each of the 50,000+  names to find 
additional errors. 
The Cong~essional  Quarterly data collection is better, but still has many errors, some identical 
to the ICPSR but some entirely new. Andrew Gelman and Gary King 
Figure 2. Estimates of House Incumbency Advantage 
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incumbency advantage in the first half of this century. Alford and Brady (1988, 
15) conclude that "all of the numerous advantages that accompany incumbency 
yielded no electoral advantage to the incumbent until sometime after 1950." Our 
empirical results provide evidence of at least a 1% or 2% incumbency advantage 
as far back as 1900. Indeed, our theoretical results also explain precisely why 
Alford and Brady concluded as they did: their measure ("slurge")  is an under- 
estimate of the true incumbency advantage.  lo 
7. Uncontested Seats 
The ability of some incumbents to scare away all challengers is probably 
the biggest advantage of  incumbency, and yet no measure-including  ours- 
completely captures this phenomenon. We  begin this section with an intuitive 
discussion of  a possible selection bias caused by  dropping uncontested seats, 
I0To test for separate Democratic and Republican incumbency advantages,  one can let t/~  = 
yo  + y,  P2. Then, Democratic incumbency advantage is yo + y, and Republican incumbency advan- 
tage is yo -  y, . We estimated these for our data from the House of  Representatives and found no 
significant difference between the two. ESTIMATING  INCUMBENCY  ADVANTAGE WITHOUT BIAS  1159 
then discuss a model that in principle could be used to generate estimates without 
bias. Our conclusion from this analysis is that if our measure is biased at all it 
only slightly underestimates the true incumbency advantage. 
Intuition 
To understand the problem that uncontested seats cause in measures of in- 
cumbency advantage, we define Y, as the effective vote: the unobserved propor- 
tion of  the two-party  vote that the Democratic candidate would have won  in 
district i had election 2 been contested. (The vote in election 1, v,  in equation 6, 
is also censored in this way, but this causes fewer problems and is much more 
difficult to correct. We focus here only on censoring in the dependent variable, 
Y, .) For contested elections, the effective vote is merely the observed Democratic 
proportion of the two-party vote (Y, = V2,).  If  Y, were observed in every district 
(i.e., if  every election were contested), the regression in equation 6 would give 
the correct estimate of incumbency advantage. 
Unfortunately, the selection of districts into our sample of contested elec- 
tions is neither exhaustive nor random. Instead, districts with very high or very 
low expected values of  Y,  are much less likely to be contested. In general, bias 
will occur only if, conditional on the explanatory variables, the sample selection 
rule is correlated with the (unobserved) dependent variable (see Achen 1986)- 
precisely the case with all incumbency advantage estimators. 
Selection bias of this sort will generally cause one to underestimate the true 
incumbency advantage. The reason can be seen intuitively by studying Figure 1. 
Imagine, for simplicity, that  Yi were observed for every district and represented 
as a point in this figure. Now  suppose that every district with a value of  Y,  (on 
the vertical axis) above 0.7 were  uncontested. A regression line fit to all the 
points would be steeper than one fit to only those below 0.7. If  we also assumed 
that contested districts were the only ones where 0.3 < Y, < 0.7, the regression 
line would be even flatter. A proper statistical procedure should be based on the 
line with all the unobserved and observed values of  Y,,  instead of  only the ob- 
served ones. Of  course, the real problem is even more difficult, since district 
elections do not become uncontested, and thus censored from our sample, by 
any simple deterministic rule. 
In assessing the bias due to selection effects, one must be careful to distin- 
guish selection due to explanatory variables, which causes no bias, and selection 
on the dependent variable, which does,  For example, our estimator cannot be 
biased  when  potential  opponents are scared off  by  variables included in  our 
model: vote, incumbency status, and party of the winner at time 1.  Our estimator 
might be  biased if  potential opponents decide not to contest an election due to 
factors we do not measure, such as a political scandal. It might also be biased if, 
'I In  other words. selection bias occurs when the selection rule and the error term are correlated. I 160  Andrew Gelman and Gary King 
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for example, a potential opponent were scared off because he or she knew that 
the incumbent could raise considerable money, beyond that of the typical incum- 
bent and beyond that reflected in the prior vote total. Because the explanatory 
variables in equation 6 incorporate most of what explains whether congressional 
elections are contested, we believe that these selection effects induce very little 
bias in 4. 
We can provide a rough estimate of an upper bound on $. Since the unob- 
served values of  Y,  are presumably extreme, we set them to their most extreme 
possible values (0 or 1) and apply equation 6. This does not solve the problem, 
but it should give an upper bound on the true incumbency advantage. Figure 3 
plots this new  estimate,  along with our original estimates from Figure 2. The 
figure shows that an appropriate selection bias  correction  would  increase the 
estimate of incumbency advantage by a very small amount: the broken line in 
Figure 3 is only greater than the solid line by only 0.01 on average and 0.04 at 
the maximum.  Since the broken line is an overestimate, the true incumbency 
effect therefore lies somewhere between these two lines, and due to the reasoning 
above we believe that it is much closer to our original estimate. ESTIMATING INCUMBENCY  ADVANTAGE WITHOUT BIAS  1161 
A Stochastic Model 
This problem can also be formalized with a somewhat more elaborate sto- 
chastic model. This model could produce consistent estimates of  incumbency 
advantage, but  it  is substantially more complicated, is more difficult to imple- 
ment, and relies on several untestable assumptions. 
Recall that if  the explanatory variables contain all the information in the 
selection rule (the rule by  which  districts become uncontested), then $ is not 
biased. To analyze this problem, denote U as a vector of  relevant unobserved 
variables. The variables U do not include our explanatory variables (v, ,  P, ,  and 
I,)  or other variables uncorrelated with them. They might include scandals, pend- 
ing retirement decisions, the lack of good challengers, the strength of the party 
organization not reflected in the prior vote total, or other variables that would 
help predict v, . 
If one were able to collect data for U,  then an easy correction to our measure 
is to include it  as an  additional explanatory variable  in  our regression equa- 
tion 6. Since this information is not available, we can theoretically correct this 
bias by assuming a probability distribution for U and a model for the probability 
of an uncontested district. 
To show this, we construct a likelihood function with factors for contested 
and uncontested districts. Define a variable C,  that equals zero if  at time 2 a 
district is uncontested and one if  it is contested. Then the contested part of the 
likelihood function is the joint distribution of Y,  ,  C, ,  and  U, integrated over the 
unknown variable U. The uncontested part of the likelihood function is the dis- 
tribution of C and U,  integrated over U.  Taking the product of the two groups of 
observations, the likelihood function is as follows: 
To understand this function better, we factor each part into separate condi- 
tional probability distributions: 1162  Andrew Gelman and Gary King 
where f  (Y2 I C2 = 1, U, P)  is just the normal distribution implied in our regres- 
sion estimator (as before for contested districts only,  C,  =  1). The  factors 
P(C,  = 1 I U,  P) and P(C,  = 0 (  U, P) are conditional probability models for a 
district being contested or uncontested, respectively. Finally, f (U  I P) is a prior 
distribution for the unobserved variable U. 
Whereas deriving a reasonable model for P(C,  = 1 I U,  P)  seems conceiv- 
able, making reasonable assumptions about f  (U  (  P)  is much more problematic. 
Determining the probability  distribution for variables we  observe is difficult; 
assuming them for particular unobserved variables is quite hazardous. However, 
deriving a reasonable distribution for a vector of variables U, even the contents 
of which we  do not know, seems impossible. One could make assumptions for 
these distributions, and then maximize the likelihood function in  equation 10, 
but the results would depend heavily on these untestable assumptions. Our analy- 
ses earlier in this section also suggest that the results would not be much different 
from our simpler regression estimator in equation 6. 
8. Concluding Remarks 
This paper provides theoretical and empirical evidence that every measure 
of incumbency advantage in the congressional literature is either biased or incon- 
sistent. We  offer a simple unbiased measure that solves most existing problems. 
One remaining problem is uncontested seats, for which we provide a theoretical 
model and bounds on the true coefficient. We  also provide the first direct evi- 
dence that being an incumbent was a net electoral benefit in the House of Rep- 
resentatives in the first half of the twentieth century. 
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APPENDIX 
This appendix provides a rigorous proof of the bias for Democratic sophomore surge stated in 
equation 3. Essentially the  same procedures can be  used to prove  bias for Republican sophomore 
surge and for retirement slump. 
The expected value of Democratic sophomore surge is as follows: 
Relabeling u2 = v,  -  6: ESTIMATING INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE WITHOUT BIAS  1163 
Using the symmetry off in the second term below in the brackets: 
Switching the labels of  v,  and u, in the second term in the brackets: 
Canceling the overlap in the two-dimensional regions of integration yields: 
Switching back the labels of  vl and u2 and again using symmetry off on the second term in 
the brackets reveals it to equal the first term. 
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